

An Evaluation of  
Automatic Voter Registration  
&  
Fayette County  
Registration Rates

*By*

*D. Stephen Voss, Ph.D.*

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# An Evaluation of Automatic Voter Registration and Fayette County Registration Rates

*By D. Stephen Voss, Ph.D.*

## **Executive Summary**

Election reformers seek to bring Automatic Voter Registration (AVR) to Kentucky as a way to increase political participation and reduce inequalities in voter turnout. AVR is a recent innovation, first implemented in Oregon before the 2016 election, but it since has been adopted in eleven other states plus the District of Columbia (NCSL 2018).

The basic idea is simple: State agencies would be required to register eligible adults with whom they interact to vote, unless an individual actively chooses to opt out. By making registration the default, the policy would expand voter lists – and having been saved the burden of registering, previously immobilized citizens would turn out on Election Day.

My charge, in undertaking this research, is to provide policy makers with background information that would help them evaluate how much of a difference AVR might make in Kentucky – especially in the Lexington area, given that I undertake this task at the request of a Fayette County elections official. This preliminary report represents the first step in a broader potential research agenda. It asks:

- (1) What does the existing history of election reforms offer by way of guidance when forecasting what effect AVR might have in Lexington?
- (2) How do current registration rates in Fayette County compare to the estimated number of eligible potential voters residing there (a key question in assessing how AVR would play out in this context)?

This preliminary report offers the following conclusions:

- Voter-registration laws historically have been controversial, because they protect against election fraud at the expense of making it harder to vote. Politicians have long fought over how best to balance the competing goals of excluding ineligible voters and including eligible ones.
- By adding a step to the voting process, registration laws do decrease political participation. Recent Political Science research suggests that approximately 3% of the potential electorate may be discouraged from voting by the need to register first. That estimate can be higher among underrepresented populations.
- Reform efforts aimed at lowering the cost of political participation have a mixed record, with some reforms helping but other reforms adding to existing inequalities in the political system. One reform, Early Voting – that is, letting citizens vote before Election Day – apparently suppresses political participation. That is, Early Voting can backfire.

- Automatic Voter Registration is a relatively new reform, so it's hard to assess what effect it is having. However, early research gives mixed results.
  - If many citizens remain unregistered, then AVR does succeed at pumping up the registration rolls.
  - However, registrants enrolled through AVR often lack motivation to vote, and turn out at disappointing rates. Most involuntary registrants do not vote.
  - So, on balance: The effects of AVR on participation are limited, and may not be worth the time or expense in many states.
  
- The effects of electoral reform depend on the state context, and especially on the current level of political participation. The more eligible voters who remain unregistered, the more AVR can make a difference. Unfortunately, determining something seemingly simple like the voter-registration rate in Kentucky – calculated as the quantity registered (numerator) divided by the quantity eligible to vote (denominator) – is almost impossible to do with any precision:
  - The numerator - The Commonwealth does not clean up voter-registration rolls very well. The number of registrants removed from the rolls falls far below the number added, even when population has not increased much – making the registration figures unbelievably high.
  - The denominator - Census figures for the voting-age population include numerous adults who cannot vote, including immigrants, felons, and people living temporarily in a state or county where they do not reside officially.
  
- After an attempt to estimate the voting-eligible population for Fayette County, rather than everyone of voting age, I find that the state reports a number of registered voters that could be almost 100% of those eligible. Either the county has zero problem getting citizens registered or, more likely, the state's voter rolls are filled with phantom registrants who cannot or should not be voting.
  
- A more-realistic estimate of registration suggest that 20% - 30% of eligible adults in Fayette County may not appear on the rolls, so AVR likely would expand voter registration, even if the effects on turnout and election outcomes end up being minimal. The registration rate likely would go up, but the turnout rate among those registered likely would go down.
  
- Voter registration in Kentucky might not be a problem in general, but engagement could lag among certain demographic groups or in certain regions, creating inequities. Because AVR apparently brings onto the voting rolls citizens typically missed by other reform efforts – in particular, groups that tend to be underrepresented politically – additional research into registration patterns would be needed before Kentucky policy makers could reject AVR out of hand.

## A Quick History of Voter Registration

Voter-registration laws spread across the United States late in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, as the population grew too large for local officials to know all of the voters in their communities. At first, the burden of identifying eligible voters typically lay with election officials, whose practice of constructing voter rolls through door-to-door visits disenfranchised laborers with longer working hours (Rothman 2016). Later, the responsibility for registering to vote passed to citizens – a change that removed the class bias inherent in making house calls, but came with the new cost of making voter registration less convenient (Tokaji 2008, p. 457).

### *The Debate over Voter-Registration Laws*

In theory, requiring election officials to keep a record of their county’s electors prevented the casting of fraudulent votes, a concern that grew more pressing as corrupt political machines emerged in many American cities after the Civil War (Harris 1929, chap. 3). However, critics attribute the popularity of voter-registration laws during the Progressive Era (roughly 1880-1920) to their success at disenfranchising immigrants in the North and African Americans in the South (Tokaji 2008, pp. 458-459).

This historical debate revolves around motive because, practically speaking, voter-registration laws both delivered the benefits alleged by sympathizers and imposed the costs alleged by critics. Requiring potential voters to register ahead of time limited fraud *and* eroded the political participation of

disadvantaged minorities. Indeed, the discriminatory motives and the anti-corruption motives for

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expanding voter-registration laws were two sides of the same coin: Migrant voters helped sustain political (usually Democratic) machines in Northern cities, while black voters helped sustain “carpetbagger” Republican governments in the South during and immediately after Reconstruction. Disenfranchising minority racial and ethnic groups was an ugly way to weaken those unsavory political organizations.

The debate over whether registration laws make elections more or less representative than they otherwise would be – whether the benefits of combatting potential fraud outweigh the costs of discouraging electoral engagement – has carried down to the present time (Rothman 2016). Advocates laud the voter-registration system for helping keep American elections relatively honest, compared to the troubled electoral systems seen, for example, in many emerging democracies. Reformers hoping to encourage more political participation, on the other hand, tend to stress the unequal levels of voter turnout observed among different

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social groups, and call for eliminating or streamlining the registration process so that voting becomes easier for underrepresented groups. As in the past, this ongoing debate divides policy makers along partisan

and ideological lines: Republicans and conservatives usually prioritize the need to prevent election fraud, while today’s Democrats and liberals usually prioritize the need to expand political participation (Lopez 2016; von Spakovsky 2013).

### *The Effects of Voter-Registration Laws*

Motives aside, requiring a two-step electoral process – in which a citizen must register to vote before an election takes place, then must cast that vote on Election Day – discourages political participation (Nickerson 2015). Eligible adults, especially younger citizens who have not yet formed the habit of voting, may forget to register in time to meet the deadline for an election that interests them (Holbein and Hillygus 2016). They may gain interest in an election only after the registration deadline has passed (Wang 2016). They may have moved residences and neglected either to register in their new communities or to pursue the absentee-ballot process in their old communities (Highton 2000). These different barriers add up: Scholars overwhelmingly agree that voter-registration laws discourage turnout in elections, compared to what voter participation would be with an easier process (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).

Analysts show less agreement when they attempt to quantify that discouragement, and in turn they differ in the effect they would anticipate from reforms intended to make registration easier or to eliminate the need for voter registration altogether. Early research on the subject estimated that, nationwide, voter-registration laws were running off perhaps 10% of potential voters. More-recent research, using both historical and contemporary data, casts doubt on those dramatic claims, however, suggesting that it might only be a few percentage points (Ansolabehere and Konisky 2006; Engstrom 2012).

One reason lowering the costs of voting may not matter much is that potential voters neglect to exercise their franchise for a variety of reasons. Take the example of people who move residences and then stop voting. Movers clearly turn out to vote at lower levels than those who stay put, but the need to register at their new addresses does not account fully for their demobilization. Instead, some

movers drop out because they have lost the social connections that once pulled them into the political system (Highton 2000). Also, they may not

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want to bother to locate a new polling place, as illustrated by the decline in turnout observed among already registered voters after their polling places shift (Brady and McNulty 2011; Haspel and Knotts 2005). Movers neglect to vote for multiple reasons, some unrelated to the registration requirement.

Meanwhile, previous attempts to ease the process for registration and voting – to lower the “costs” of voting, as scholars term it – have given disappointing results. Some of the supposed reforms, such as voting by mail (VBM), either did not increase voter participation or they increased it primarily among the sorts of people who tended to vote anyway. Either way, such innovations did not erode existing inequalities in participation, contrary to the hopes of reformers (Berinsky et al. 2001; Rigby and Springer 2011; Kousser and Mullin 2007; Springer 2012; Berinsky 2005).

For example, the common reform most focused on eliminating registration as a barrier to political participation, same-day election registration – which allows a citizen to register to vote on Election Day – does appear to increase voter participation (Burden et al. 2014; Knack

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and White 2000; Larocca and Klemanski 2011; Wang 2016). Like other electoral reforms, however, it may not live up to the promise of equalizing political participation

between advantaged and disadvantaged groups. In particular, citizens of low socioeconomic status do not appear to mobilize when the costs of voting go down (Nickerson 2015; Knack and White 2000; Mitchell and Wlezien 1995; Springer 2012).

### *The Effect of Early Voting*

One popular election reform intended to make voting easier – allowing citizens to cast ballots before Election Day – on the whole actually seems to discourage voter participation (Burden et al. 2014; Giammo and Brox 2010; Larocca and Klemanski 2011; Kousser and Mullin 2007). Early voting, like Automatic Voter Registration, tried to remove one of the major “costs” of voting that are thought to drive down turnout – in this case, the need to vote on a single day, a Tuesday. “For voters, the ability to cast a ballot early reduces the costs of participation ... by making it more convenient to vote on one’s own schedule,” Giammo and Brox (2010, p. 295) write. The state of Oregon again was an early adopter, and their experience seemed positive enough that other states followed suit – but context matters, and outcomes around the country did not mimic Oregon’s:

- California sometimes requires registered voters in less-populous precincts to cast their ballots early through the mail. Kousser and Mullin (2007) compare those registered voters with matching citizens living in places that required voting at the precinct station. They found that the convenience of voting from home did not increase turnout in 2000 and 2002. Indeed, in the high-profile presidential and gubernatorial contests,

participation fell 2-3 percentage points lower among those invited to vote by mail from home (although the pattern reversed in a few localized special elections). The analysts attribute this unexpected outcome to the difficulty of managing early voting through the mail.

- However, another high-profile study of early voting, by Giammo and Brox (2010), looked at in-person early voting and came away equally pessimistic. They examined voting rates in 500 counties over eight presidential elections, and determined that making voting more convenient might give a one-time bump in participation – possibly caused by publicity surrounding the novel policy – but that eventually turnout declined to a lower level than where it started. States might want to invest the time and money needed to implement early voting as a convenience to people who would have voted anyway, but they should not expect to expand the electorate that way.
- Larocca and Klemanski (2011) compared the effect of early voting with four other electoral reforms, using turnout estimates from the Census Bureau for 2000, 2004, and 2008. Even after taking into account a host of influences on whether someone votes, the authors conclude that in all three presidential elections, individuals living in locations with in-person early voting were less likely to vote than those living in locations that required most voters to show up on Election Day. Larocca and Klemanski (2011, pp. 92-93) attribute this surprising result to the way political parties and news organizations react to the knowledge that voting is spread out rather than concentrated in a single day. With a single election day, organizations generate a lot of hoopla that pulls people to the polls, whereas party efforts and media coverage cannot mobilize as many people in states that spread voting out over multiple days.
- Using county turnout data in addition to individual Census reports, Burden et al. (2014) reach the same negative conclusion about Early Voting. Early voting has the direct

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effect of making voting easier, which might seem as though it would increase turnout, but they argue that indirectly it undermines a voter’s motivation to show up. “Rather than building up to a frenzied Election Day in which media coverage and interpersonal conversations revolve around politics, early voting makes voting a more private and less intense process. Social pressure is less evident, guidance on how and where to vote is less handy, and the prospect of positive social interactions at the polls is decreased,” Burden et al. (2014, p. 97) explain. Political parties and national campaigns also neglect states with early voting, because they get less bang for their buck. “When much of the eligible population has already voted in advance of Election Day, there is less payoff for continued get-out-the-vote activities,” they write (2014, p. 98).

The limited success of these rule-based changes may have surprised reformers, but it fit with survey data asking people why they do not vote. Unregistered citizens often attribute their lack of electoral participation to reasons unrelated to the inconvenience of getting onto the voter rolls. In one Pew Charitable Trusts survey, for example, less than half of non-voters blamed

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obstacles to registering. The largest number expressed no interest in voting, and indicated that they did not care who wins federal elections.

Many unregistered adults report that they care little about politics, government, or community affairs. They rarely discuss political topics with their friends and family, and they do not understand government (Creek and Ueyama 2017). They do not register to vote because they have no desire to vote.

### *The Debate over Automatic Voter Registration*

Reforms intended to increase voter participation do not regularly increase participation, and even when they do, they rarely lessen inequality when it comes to representation in the electorate. But perhaps registration reforms have not gone far enough? What if, instead of allowing voter registration on the same day as voting takes place, reformers remove the

registration burden entirely and set up some kind of system in which citizens move onto the voting rolls automatically, a reform known as Automatic Voter Registration (AVR)? Experience with that reform is limited, because it is so new – but because it is being considered as a possible policy shift in Kentucky, I focus on that innovation here.

The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), also known as the Motor-Voter Act, required state governments to provide voter-registration opportunities when eligible citizens interacted with certain state agencies – in particular, when they applied for or renewed a driver’s license, or when they applied for public assistance. Automatic Voter Registration (AVR), as first implemented in the state of Oregon, built from this framework. Instead of merely being offered a voter-registration opportunity when submitting documents to the Department of Motor Vehicles or applying for public assistance, eligible citizens would be registered to vote automatically unless they specifically asked to be excluded.

This difference between needing to opt in and being allowed to opt out can seem trivial (Wang 2016). Those who wish to remain off of the voter rolls – for example, due to a fear that registering to vote might increase the risk of being called for jury duty – still would be able to do so under AVR. Even if new citizens moved onto the voting rolls under AVR and stayed there, presumably their minimal interest in

politics and government would keep them from voting on Election Day.

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automatic registration should rope in few new people who actually want to vote.

Nevertheless, supporters and opponents give vastly different predictions about AVR:

- Supporters of AVR predict dramatic results. People put off making decisions when they can. Deciding how to cast an important vote is the sort of thing they will procrastinate on doing – even if it means missing the deadline for registering to vote (Wang 2016).

The mobility of the U.S. population causes many potential voters to face that dilemma:

The Brennan Center for Justice at New York University, which advocates AVR, notes that

one in nine Americans move each year (Lopez 2016). Notably, that mobility also explains why one eighth of voter registrations in the United States are invalid or significantly inaccurate (Lopez 2016; Pillsbury and Johannesen 2016; Creek and Ueyama 2017). AVR would help many of these people.

- Opponents expect AVR would have limited effects, some of them bad. For example, the Heritage Foundation – a conservative policy think tank – characterizes AVR as a “a ‘solution’ in search of a problem” (von Spakovsky 2013). AVR would not increase political participation much if the unregistered sit out elections because they are not interested in or involved in politics. As for the transients who do not get around to registering but who do care about politics, they might be just as sluggish about transferring their driver’s license as they are about transferring their voter registration, in which case AVR might not help them. Thus, AVR would be as ineffectual as the Motor Voter Act, which did not increase political participation but instead “only led to an increase in the number of registered voters who do not vote.” Critics also note several potential practical problems with AVR, including but not limited to difficulties in using government databases to distinguish citizens from non-citizens and the cost to state and local officials of implementing such a policy.

### *The Effects of Automatic Voter Registration*

Unfortunately, little evidence exists to evaluate the effect of AVR. Oregon became the first state to pass AVR legislation, when Gov. Kate Brown signed HB 2177 into state law on 16 March 2015. Since then, the District of Columbia and nine other states – Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Oregon, Rhode Island, and West Virginia – have adopted a version of the policy. These changes took place too recently to generate reliable data. Indeed, some of those early adopters did not implement the reform before the 2016 elections. The District of Columbia began implementing it in October 2017.

The federal elections of 2016 were the first time any state had fully implemented AVR, and in terms of the full election cycle, only Oregon had done so. Specifically, among states that

committed to implementing AVR, only Oregon had implemented an AVR program before votes were cast in the 2016 primaries. As such, Oregon provides the only data available for analyzing both the effects of AVR on voter registration and the effects of AVR on voter turnout.

Oregon’s AVR program, called Oregon Motor Voter (OMV), started in January 2016. By April 2016, the Brennan Center for Justice began claiming dramatically positive results. They reported that while Oregon registered 4,163 new voters per month in the 2012 election cycle and 3,955 per month in the 2014 election cycle, an average of 15,375 registrants had been added per month over the first few months of 2016 (Brater 2016).

Of course, having an open contest for the presidency might have pumped up interest among first-time voters. However, the Center for American Progress (CAP), a liberal think tank, draws similarly optimistic conclusions from Oregon despite taking a different path to get there (Griffin et al. 2017). To estimate the number of new registrants who would not have appeared on the rolls without OMV, the researchers identified people who did not register to vote in the four previous federal election years despite having reached sufficient age in 2008 to be eligible, and then focused on the ones who had not registered themselves – the ones, that is, who likely had been registered automatically. About 116,000 of Oregon’s newly registered voters met their criteria in 2016, and among those newly registered voters, more than 40,000 voted in the 2016 general election. For only a third of the new OMV registrants to cast ballots might seem like a limited success, but those voters represented 2.2% of the total number of votes cast in Oregon in 2012, enough to swing a close election. In part due to these new voters, Oregon witnessed a 4.1% jump in total ballots cast in 2016 compared to 2012, a bigger climb than seen

in any other state.

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The CAP report also indicates that voters registered through AVR in Oregon differ from those who were already registered in important ways.

First, those registered via AVR were

younger than traditional registrants: People between the ages of 18 and 29 comprise about

18% of Oregon’s traditional registrants, while more than 40% of those registered through AVR were in that age group. Second, AVR registrants were slightly more likely to live in suburban areas than traditional registrants, and slightly less likely to live in urban areas. Third, AVR registrants lived in less wealthy areas than traditional registrants, and they tended to live in areas with lower levels of educational attainment. And fourth, AVR registrants were somewhat more likely to be Hispanic than were traditional registrants, while AVR registrants were slightly less likely to be white, black, or Asian. Oregon’s experience suggests that AVR might lessen some inequalities in political participation.

A report from the left-leaning think tank Demos corroborates the CAP findings. Demos estimates that OMV increased turnout by 2 to 3 percentage points – a range that envelopes the CAP figure of 2.2% – and agrees that Automatic Voter Registration diversified the Oregon electorate (McElwee et al. 2017). Demos estimates that 11% of first-time OMV voters were people of color, compared to only 6% of traditional voters. That equalization effect might have been even greater, because 15% of the individuals registered through OMV were people of color, but that group ended up turning out at a lower rate, lessening the full effect. Similarly, 9% of those registered through OMV were Latinos, but only 7% of the new voters were – which still helped equalize the electorate, given that only 3% of traditional Oregon voters were Latino. The Demos report also corroborates the CAP’s finding that OMV registrants trended younger: 37% of first-time voters registered through OMV were under 30 years old, compared to only 13% of traditional first-time voters. Demos specifically looked at the geographical location of newly mobilized voters, with intriguing results: Approximately 39% of new OMV voters in 2016 lived in census blocks with median household incomes below \$45,000 – compared to only 34% of traditional voters. The limited impact of AVR in Oregon did not result only because of newly registered voters who stayed home:

8% of those initially registered through OMV actively opted out.

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A November 2016 report by the Pew Charitable Trusts was more

reserved, characterizing Oregon’s results from the 2016 election as “mixed” (Beitsch 2016).

Pew reports that only 100,000 of the 230,000 Oregonians registered through OMV (43%) ultimately voted in 2016, a participation rate barely more than half that seen among Oregon’s traditional registered voters. Being able to skip the registration stage clearly did not induce most of this constituency to turn out. Of those who did, they tended already to have developed political allegiances, as indicated by Oregon’s procedure of listing automatic registrants by default as “independent” but allowing them to declare a political-party affiliation afterward. Among the automatic registrants who declared a political party affiliation – an active step that suggests they might have registered to vote on their own anyway – 84% participated in the 2016 elections. Those who were passive at the registration stage remained passive on Election Day, with only 35% voting. Adding so many disinterested citizens to the voter rolls pulled down the state’s participation rate: The 80% turnout rate among registered voters in 2016 was

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Oregon’s lowest since 2000.

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Oregon’s electoral laws stand out in numerous ways compared to the rules and regulations found in other states, making it unrepresentative. Relying solely on

results from Oregon to estimate the effect of a voting reform will not be reliable (Kousser and Mullin 2007). Data on AVR from other states so far remains painfully limited, however.

Georgia implemented AVR in January 2017, and by May of that year, 559,179 new voter-registration applications had gone through the Department of Driver Services – an impressive figure given that in the previous non-election year, 2015, Georgia processed fewer than 100,000 new applications (Dunlap 2017).

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“...the Department of Motor Vehicles learned that their program had mistakenly registered non-citizens to vote.”

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Vermont tried to implement AVR in January 2017 as well, but

suspended the program before a month had passed when the Department of Motor Vehicles learned that their program had mistakenly registered non-citizens to vote (D'Ambrosio 2017).

Luke McHale, a Burlington resident who had married an American citizen and held a green card,

informed the DMV of their error after receiving notification that he had been registered. An investigation determined that the number of incorrectly registered non-citizens was small, however, so Vermont resumed their program and by June 30 the state had registered 12,344 new voters, a 62% increase over the same period in the 2016 election year (Covey 2017).

Thus, the limited results from Georgia and Vermont confirm the experience in Oregon, which is that AVR can increase voter registration in states where the Motor Voter Act and other election reforms (such as easy absentee balloting) have not already moved most citizens into the registrant pool. However, early evidence suggests that these passive registrants often will not vote anyhow. Projecting that limited evidence onto other states depends on how many unregistered but interested eligible voters reside in a state.

### *Conclusion*

This review of the history of voter-registration laws, and especially the modern record of reforms intended to make registration easier, does not permit a confident forecast of how AVR would play out in Fayette County (let alone in the Commonwealth of Kentucky as a whole).

Registration requirements do discourage voting, but not to the drastic degree that analysts once estimated. Citizens must want to vote, or they will be unlikely to bear the burden of doing so even when they need not register ahead of an election – which explains why voting reforms rarely live up to the hopes of their champions. Past reforms oriented toward lowering the cost of voting not only failed to mobilize the electorate to the extent promised, in many cases they failed to diversify the electorate, and in some instances they appear to have worsened political inequality by increasing the mobilization of groups already heavily represented within the system. One of the most popular reforms, in-person early voting, appears to have backfired entirely, shrinking rather than expanding the electorate.

The limited data on AVR do not warrant such dire forecasts for that particular innovation. A surge in registration rates witnessed after implementation of AVR in Oregon, Georgia, and Vermont – not to mention the electoral participation of Oregon's newly registered

voters in 2016 – reduces the risk that AVR would exacerbate existing political inequalities. AVR might not help much, but it does seem to help. The question with AVR seems to be whether the beneficial effects of AVR could outweigh the potential costs and risks of transitioning to a new voter-registration system. As Giammo and Brox (2010) put it, “In making voting easier and more convenient, society does not reduce the overall costs of participation in any given election. Rather, early voting merely transfers certain costs from the individual to society – in this case, the counties that conduct elections.”

Are the benefits worth it? Those expected beneficial effects depend on the underlying electoral conditions already operating in a state: To what extent are potential voters already registered, thanks to previous voting reforms and voter-mobilization efforts? To what extent do registration and turnout rates create inequities that AVR would be likely to mitigate? I turn to the question of Fayette County’s registration rate in the second half of this preliminary report. Any exploration of inequalities, as well as comparisons with other Kentucky counties, must await a full report should we undertake one.

### **Estimating Fayette County Participation Rates**

Analysts seeking to measure electoral participation almost always look at a simple ratio: the number of people who participated divided by the number of people who could have participated. The math itself could not be easier:

$$\text{Participation Rate} = \text{Participants} / \text{Eligible People}$$

A naïve analyst, attempting to judge Fayette County participation in the 2016 presidential election, might divide the number of votes cast in that contest by the number of adults living in Fayette as of the last Census. That’s 136,315 votes in the presidential contest divided by 227,391 residents of voting age, or a voter turnout of 59.9%. Less than a month before the election, Fayette County reported 224,659 registered voters, so a back-of-the-envelope calculation would result in a registration rate of 98.8% (incredibly high). This simple approach would mean that  $136,315 / 224,659 = 60.7\%$  of registered voters participated. See Table 1.

**TABLE 1 - Differing Estimates of the Fayette County Registration Rate**

<b>Method</b>	<b>Estimated Rate</b>	<b>Numerator: # Registered</b>	<b>Numerator Source</b>	<b>Denominator: # Possible</b>	<b>Denominator Source</b>
Naïve Raw Numbers	<b>98.80</b>	224,659	Oct. 2016 Registration	227,391	2010 Census VAP
Adjusted for Population Change	<b>91.48</b>	224,659	Oct. 2016 Registration	245,584	2016 5-Year ACS Adults
Adjusted to Remove State Ineligibles	<b>95.79</b>	224,659	Oct. 2016 Registration	234,533	USEP 2016 VEP Estimates
Adjusted to Remove Fayette Non-Citizens	<b>97.84</b>	224,659	Oct. 2016 Registration	229,621	2016 5-Year ACS Citizens
Also Adjusted to Remove Felons (DOC)	<b>99.51</b>	224,659	Oct. 2016 Registration	225,761	Ky DOC Restoration Requests
Also Adjusted to Remove Felons (Registry)	<b>99.32</b>	224,659	Oct. 2016 Registration	226,187	Ky Sex Offender Registry
Adjusted to Reflect Survey Reports	<b>69.40</b>	162,766	2016 CPS Survey Estimate	234,533	USEP 2016 Citizen Estimates
Adjusted to Reflect Cross-State Migration	<b>87.78</b>	195,523	Cross-County Migration	222,753	Ky Sex Offender Registry

Unfortunately, when it comes to determining the registration rate in a given area, neither the numerator nor the denominator in the calculation is so simple.

- The numerator, or number of people registered to vote, comes from election officials who lack an easy way to strip ineligible registrants from their rolls. Former voters may appear in a variety of databases used to clean up the state voter-registration rolls, such as a list of felony convictions or a list of people who registered elsewhere, in which case the Kentucky Secretary of State’s office might remove them from voting lists. However, county clerks generally do not purge their own voting rolls, for example based on an individual’s failure to vote or based on real-estate exchanges in their county. The stickiness of voter-registration lists guarantees that a naïve calculation of the registration rate would make it look higher than it effectively is. Election canvassers have reported to me that, when they visit houses to campaign, their list of registered voters may include members of two or three families, only one of which still occupies the residence. More obviously, some counties in Kentucky (as well as in other states) report more registered voters than the number of adults who live there.
- The denominator, or number of people allowed to vote, is even more complicated.

- Between population growth across the United States and population turnover within American counties, the number of voting-age people in each county can change rapidly between one Census and the next (and not uniformly). Most counties contained more voting-age adults in 2016 than they contained in 2010, at the time of the last Census – some dramatically more – which will cause the registration rate to look higher in most places than it really is. However, a minority of counties lost population during that same period, driving down their registration rates compared to the truth.
- Only U.S. citizens enjoy the right to vote in federal elections. As the number of migrants to the United States increased since the Sixties, the share of voting-age people ineligible to vote climbed as well. Naively using the entire population ages 18 and up when computing the registration rate or the turnout rate will make a county’s citizens look more apathetic than they really are (McDonald and Popkin 2001). Some of those non-voters are migrants without voting rights.
- A majority of U.S. states forbid voting by convicted felons during their incarceration. Different states restore the felon’s voting rights at different times, some as soon as the convict leaves prison while others wait until the convict is no longer on parole or under probation. Some states, however, do not restore voting rights to most convicted felons even after they leave the supervision of the criminal-justice system. Kentucky currently numbers among the stricter states. The voting-age population, therefore, includes convicted felons who legally cannot register and vote, which pumps up the denominator artificially and therefore makes citizens seem less engaged than they really are.
- Although non-citizens and felons make up the largest share of ineligible voters, population mobility also can skew the denominator when calculating the registration rate. Citizens who move into the state within 28 days of an election do not meet the residency requirement to register and vote. Whether that rule inflates or deflates a calculation of the registration rate depends on whether the old residents or the new residents were more likely to participate politically.

Meanwhile, citizens may live in a state or community but not consider it their primary residence. The Census Bureau's rules normally would result in both college students and prisoners being counted where they currently live – their college addresses and their prison locations, respectively – even if they consider a parental home or a private home elsewhere to be their permanent addresses (Cohn 2010a, 2010b). Depending on the institutions present in a community or a county, these secondary residences can bump up the voting-age population with people who would not register to vote there.

Add up all of these distortions that can skew a calculation of the voter-registration rate, and estimating that ratio is a thorny measurement problem with no clear answer. This research will walk through some of those complications, and present options for estimating Lexington's registration rate.

For most of this preliminary report, I will treat the registration numbers from the state as given – will treat the numerator as correct – and focus on possible options for the Voting-Eligible Population (VEP) that appears in the denominator. The resulting registration rate will not be correct: People inevitably slip through the process of cleaning up voter lists, even though they no longer live in a precinct, so the numerator will be too high. However, using the real registration numbers allows my analysis to ask a meaningful question: How large is the voter-registration list compared to the number of eligible people estimated to live there? That is, what share of the eligible population does the number of registered voters represent? The result serves as a good baseline because it represents a ceiling for the registration rate; the number of true registered voters can be no larger than the size of the registration list. As an added virtue of this preliminary approach, adjusting the denominator is possible using data and methods that are relatively easy to describe. A subsequent report can grapple more fully with the hazier task of guessing what share of the county's official registered-voter count might represent phantom registrants, a question that has bedeviled elections officials and caused controversy when officials worked too aggressively at purging their lists.

### *The Census Bureau's American Community Survey*

Of the difficulties facing any attempt to calculate Fayette County's voter-registration rate, the simplest to address is population change since the last Census. In between each comprehensive head count, the Census Bureau conducts annual surveys intended to estimate how the population has changed over the intervening years. The American Community Survey (ACS) includes both a 1-year and a rolling 5-year version, allowing the researcher a choice between precision (because the 5-year survey incorporates more data) and currency (because the 1-year survey only uses recent data). For purposes of this report, I always use the estimates built from five years of results.

The Census Bureau estimates that Fayette County contained 311,529 people in 2016, of whom 245,584 were ages 18 and over. That is, between 2010 and 2016, Fayette's Voting-Age Population (VAP) increased by 18,193 adults, an 8% increase since the Census, which means the initial raw calculation using Census data made the registration rate look too high. Just the one adjustment of substituting estimated 2016 VAP in the place of the official 2010 VAP changes the registration rate from an unrealistic 98.8% to a high, but at least more believable, 91.5%.

### *The United States Election Project*

Political scientist Michael P. McDonald coauthored a pioneering research article for the discipline's top peer-reviewed journal, the *American Political Science Review*, that confronted the problems created by using the Voting-Age Population (or VAP) when computing the rate of voter turnout. Emphasizing the growth in both migrants and felons among the U.S. population, McDonald and Popkin (2001) urged analysts to divide vote counts (and by implication voter-registration counts) by the Voting-Eligible Population (or VEP) instead, subtracting from the denominator those residents ineligible to vote.

From that launching point, McDonald subsequently developed a broader research agenda on electoral participation, eventually forming the United States Election Project (USEP).

Through the USEP’s Web page, McDonald distributes state-level VEP numbers as well as voter-participation rates computed using those numbers (McDonald 2017).

The CSEP’s releases do not provide a direct way to improve the estimated registration rate for Fayette County, because McDonald (2018) limits himself to the state level. In particular, the criminal-justice data on which he relies to compute felon disenfranchisement does not drop below the state level. For that reason, scholars working with county data often stick to simple Voting-Age Population figures, using the justification that “VEP is not available at the county level” (Burden et al. 2014, p. 103). However, it is possible to apply McDonald’s corrections for Kentucky to Fayette County, as though it were typical of the state as a whole, to see what his adjustments would imply locally.

McDonald (2017) indicates that 2.5% of the Kentucky population consists of non-citizens ineligible to vote. He estimates that another 2% of the population falls within the criminal-justice system in a way that likely prevents them from voting. With that correction, McDonald estimates a presidential-election turnout rate of 58.7% for the Commonwealth, substantially higher than the 56.1% that results from a naïve calculation using the Voting-Age Population. Pretending that non-citizens and felons may vote, by using the VAP, would make the citizenry look less engaged, and would make election officials look less successful, than they actually are. Because a large share of demobilized “potential voters” actually lack the right to vote in the first place, the need to register is not what excluded them from the political process. Note that

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“Pretending that non-citizens and felons may vote ... would make the citizenry look less engaged, and would make election officials look less successful, than they actually are.”

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this shift of 2.6 percentage points, brought about simply by computing the registration rate better, is comparable to the entire benefit attributed to some voting reforms, such as Automatic Voter Registration in Oregon.

Applying those rates to Fayette County, instead of using a VAP of 245,584 for 2016, we would use an estimated VEP of 234,533. The county’s 224,659 official registrants represent

95.8% of the likely eligible population. Based on those numbers, Fayette County would appear to be leaving very few potential voters by the wayside.

### *Improving the Fayette County Voting-Eligible Population Estimate*

Simply applying the United States Election Project's Kentucky numbers to Fayette County likely underestimates participation in Lexington. As a city, Lexington attracts more immigrants, including undocumented migrants (which the Census might not catch), than many rural areas with less-complex economies. Specifically, while DataUSA reports that 97.9% of Kentucky's population holds U.S. citizenship, only 93.1% of the Fayette County population does so (DataUSA 2018). Lexington also might not attract a proportional share of disenfranchised felons. A direct estimate of Fayette County's Voting-Eligible Population would be much better.

The Census Bureau's 5-Year American Community Survey (ACS) places the estimate of non-citizens slightly lower, at 6.5%. Assuming that the rate is the same for voting-age people – a conservative assumption, because if anything it might be higher – the eligible population would drop from 245,584 to 229,621. The resulting registration rate: 97.8%.

Pulling out disenfranchised felons is more difficult, which is presumably the main reason why USEP does not create county-level VEP figures. Criminal-justice data related to overall felon populations usually focus on states. The USEP, recall, estimated Kentucky's felony disenfranchisement rate at 2%, or almost 69,000 voting-age adults – and originally, assuming that the disenfranchisement rate would be the same everywhere, I counted a little more than 4,900 Lexington adults as ineligible for criminal-justice reasons. However, we can use outside information to figure out more directly how many of those 69,000 disenfranchised Kentucky felons might reside in Lexington.

Upon leaving the supervision of the criminal-justice system, former convicts may request to have their civil rights restored. Obviously their likelihood of making such a request could vary from one county to the next (e.g., depending on whether political parties or campaigns encourage them to apply). Nonetheless, I have no reason to think that Lexington

would be extraordinary in this regard, so I can look at the proportion of restoration requests filed from Lexington compared to elsewhere in the state. Data on civil-rights restoration requests filed from the start of November 2015 until Halloween of 2016, provided by Kentucky’s Department of Corrections after a formal request by one of my research assistants (Travis Taylor), indicates that the DOC received 1,129 submissions, including 63 from Lexington, 5.6% of the total. If Lexington’s share of these requests matches Lexington’s share of former felons, then of the approximately 69,000 disenfranchised citizens, 3,860 would come from Lexington, a slightly lower number than originally assumed. Nonetheless, adding this correction will result in an even higher registration rate than the approach that removed non-citizens but ignored disenfranchised felons. The estimated Fayette County Voting-Eligible Population drops from 229,621 to 225,761 – approaching very close to the total number of names on the Fayette County voter-registration rolls, a registration rate of 99.5%!

Because the last calculation relied on the county-by-county distribution of restoration requests, rather than the distribution of actual former convicts, it would be nice to try again using actual data on a county’s share of the state’s felons and former felons. We could identify

no public record identifying where former inmates lived, with one exception, a class of criminal whose whereabouts must be disclosed to the public: sex offenders. Having no reason to assume that sex offenders

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Adding a correction for disenfranchised felons produces an eligible-voter count “approaching very close to the total number of names on the Fayette County voter-registration rolls, a registration rate of 99.5%!”

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would favor or disfavor Fayette County, compared to other sorts of lawbreakers, we can use Lexington’s share of those felons as a proxy for the share of all felons. Fayette County reported 409 sex offenders at the start of Summer 2018, compared to a statewide total of 8,218 – or just about 5% of the state’s total. That’s a slightly lower estimate than we received using the restoration petitions, which would make sense if city dwellers had an easier time submitting such paperwork; it would mean that 3,434 of the USEP’s disenfranchised felons lived in Fayette County. This approach to removing felons still means that the voter-registration list almost matches the population. If everyone listed as a registered voter in Fayette County really were

alive and able to vote in Lexington, then more than 99% of the population would already be able to participate in elections. Were that true, Automatic Voter Registration (AVR) would have little or nothing to offer Fayette County.

### *Students and Transients*

The final major group that might appear in the Voting-Age Population, yet not really be eligible to vote in Lexington, are people who arrived recently and either do not intend to shift their primary residence to Fayette County or could not do so in time for a given election. This group would not be trivial in Lexington due to one distinct group of transients: college students. Many do not consider themselves residents of, and therefore voters in, Fayette County but if they follow proper Census Bureau regulations then they would be counted as living in Lexington anyway (Cohn 2010a).

Unlike with non-citizens or disenfranchised felons, both of which make registration rates look too low, the effect of transients could go either way. Some counties might have more of their residents living elsewhere, and being counted among populations somewhere else, which would bump up their registration rates artificially. Other places might have a large population of transients who belong to another county, lowering their apparent registration rates.

Fayette County numbers among the latter. Home to the state's largest university, the University of Kentucky, as well as other institutions of higher education that enroll voting-age students from outside the county, Fayette County almost certainly contains more transients than it sends out to other locales. UK alone enrolls more than 20,000 undergraduates, and more than 30,000 students total. A third of those students come from out of state, and so while they would live in Fayette County for purposes of the Census, they need not register there. Trying to remove these students from the VEP estimate would take the registration rate well past 100%, making it crystal clear that some of Fayette County's registrants do not belong on the voter rolls.

On the other hand, trying to remove these students likely would be a mistake. College students may not register at high levels, but the ones who do register tend to move away soon afterward, so areas populated by students likely contain the largest share of phantom registrants. Notably, all of the precincts carving up the University of Kentucky report turnout rates in the 2016 election below Fayette County's median, three of them in the bottom ten out of 291. Just as university precincts include a lot of people in the denominator who actually are not eligible to vote, making registration rates look artificially low, they also include a lot of people in the numerator who actually are no longer registered and in place there, making the rates look high. Lacking any indication how to treat these countervailing errors, my assumption is that they can be ignored when estimating the registration rate – especially when considering that, even among the students who would be eligible, their residence on a college campus and their use of financial aid would keep many of them out of the government offices that would be obligated to implement AVR. AVR would not increase their political participation.

### **Toward a Fix for the Registration Numbers**

The most-sophisticated estimate presented here for the Fayette County registration rate suggests that the size of the voter list almost perfectly matches the number of eligible voters living there. Taken at face value, the data might lead the naïve to conclude that almost everyone eligible to vote in Lexington has registered to do so. However, it's not true that just about every eligible adult already has registered – and it would be irresponsible to claim, based on the registration rates reported here, that AVR could make zero difference in Lexington. Rather, Fayette County's near-perfect registration rate reflects insufficient screening and cleaning of voter lists by the Commonwealth.

I am not the first to observe this weakness. In fact, the quality of Kentucky's voter-registration data faced legal challenge from the conservative group Judicial Watch, resulting in a settlement last month between the Commonwealth and the U.S. Justice Department that included requirements to clean up Kentucky's voter-registration list (Queen 2018; Judicial Watch 2018; Department of Justice 2018). The two sides in that controversy disagreed over

how serious the problem might be, with the Kentucky Secretary of State's Office suggesting that they have been successful keeping the voter rolls reasonably clean while Judicial Watch claimed that the rolls were filled with ineligible people. But no one seems to dispute that many eligible adults are not registered to vote, while many names on the registration rolls really cannot and will not vote. The challenge is that no one really knows how large those groups are.

The enterprise of estimating the number of phantom registrants, a task which bedevils actual election officials, falls outside the scope of this preliminary report. However, I will end with a couple of initial stabs at pulling that numerator down toward a more-reasonable figure – nothing fully satisfying, but at least numbers on which to build.

#### *Using the Census CPS Election Supplement*

Every two years, the Census Bureau conducts the Current Population Survey (CPS), which includes a Voting and Registration Supplement. It asks who is registered and who turns out. Because this methodology relies on people to report their own level of political engagement – and people tend to say they participate when they do not – the CPS contains error. Yet it is adjusted in a way that encourages scholars to trust the numbers enough for research purposes. Even were the numbers padded due to the over-reporting of political engagement, it will produce a registration rate far below that found using sticky voter-registration rolls.

Unfortunately, as with the USEP estimates for Voting-Eligible Population, the registration and turnout rates from the CPS only apply to the state level. Their method of data collection is not appropriate for a county analysis. Thus, like with the USEP calculations, I will need to take the state-level CPS numbers and assume, temporarily, that we can project them down to Fayette County – recognizing that Fayette, due to differences in record keeping and greater migration in-flows, likely looks better than the state as a whole. The CPS state figures indicate that only 69.4% of Kentucky citizens report being registered, which would mean almost one out of five of Kentucky's "registered voters" is not real! That dismal figure represents a floor, the worst Fayette likely could be.

On a purely numerical basis, if more than 30% of Fayette’s eligible adults remain unregistered, automatic voter registration could pump up the size of the potential electorate very quickly. On the other hand, as past research has shown, that number is still small enough that it matches the quantities of American adults who admit flat out that they do not care about politics, about who wins elections – basically, who lack the motivation needed to vote even after being registered by someone else. Perhaps those unregistered adults cluster in certain places or among certain social groups, such that AVR could make a target difference in erasing existing inequalities, a question that later research could address. But on a purely citywide basis, a 69.4% registration rate will represent most of the citizens with a recurrent wish to cast ballots.

#### *Comparing Registration Changes to Population Changes*

Computing better estimates of the real, as opposed to the official, voter-registration rate would require a complex research design looking over various sorts of data available to state officials: frequency of voting, deed transfers, size and diversity of households according to the voter rolls, etc. Some sampling of Fayette county households, to estimate the error rate, would be a big step were funding available. Because I lack these resources, most of those attempts to refine the registration rate’s numerator extend beyond the scope of this preliminary report.

However, the Fayette County Clerk’s Office provided me with counts of registration changes by year from 2007-2017 (see Table 2). They are greatly limited data, so I hesitate to draw any strong conclusions from them. Nevertheless, they allow an informal way to gauge the stickiness of the voter-registration data. In any one year, we might not be surprised to see a bump in registrations that have nothing to do with population changes – say, by people registering in large numbers to participate in a presidential contest. But averaged over multiple years and multiple circumstances, it is reasonable to expect that the balance of additions and subtractions from the voter-registration rolls would approximate the balance of migration in-flows and migration out-flows seen among the adult population.

**TABLE 2 - Fayette County Voters Added and Removed**

<b>Year</b>	<b>New Registrations</b>	<b>Deletions</b>	<b>Absolute CHANGE</b>	<b>% CHANGE</b>
2007	8,165	1,127	7,038	7.2
2008	11,876	1,584	10,292	7.5
2009	7,144	1,477	5,667	4.8
2010	9,331	1,186	8,145	7.9
2011	9,892	1,175	8,717	8.4
2012	13,916	1,056	12,860	13.2
2013	11,074	982	10,092	11.3
2014	16,642	889	15,753	18.7
2015	13,563	7189	7,038	1.9
2016	20,325	10,847	9,478	1.9
2017	13,555	8,652	4,903	1.6

Data provided by: Tracy Merriman, Fayette County Clerk of Court Office

Every year, those data show that the state added many more voters to the Fayette County rolls than they deleted, from two times as many in recent years to as high as 19 times as many in 2014. Even in 2015, the year of a purge of the rolls, almost twice as many people registered than were eliminated. From 2011-2015, the state added just over 65,000 new registrants, while dropping 11,291, an increase of almost 6-to-1! The lopsided enrollment numbers are not quite as outlandish as they seem, because over the time period, Lexington and the broader Bluegrass Region stood out due to population flowing into the area (Stone 2014). However, such a surge in new registrants would have required the city to be gaining population at a breakneck pace while retaining almost everyone who already lived there. The population shifts were not that dramatic. Lexington did not see a massive expansion in population – nor

did it experience a massive surge in housing or in household size – during that period to explain why new registrations would spike.

To estimate how many voters should have been stripped from the rolls, based on the actual balance of Fayette County residents who flowed into and out of the state, I employ the Census Bureau's migration in-flows and out-flows. It allows me to compare the churn in voter registration to the turnover in population.

- First, let's look at people who moved to Fayette County (Table B07001 of the 5-Year ACS for 2016). Of the 307,578 people living in Fayette in 2016, only 232,366 lived in the same house where they had resided the year before, or roughly  $\frac{3}{4}$  of them. Some had moved from elsewhere in Kentucky, or even elsewhere in Fayette County, but 12,179 had come from outside the state and another 3,587 had come from outside the country.
- Looking at the Census Bureau's County-to-County Migration Outflow data (Census Bureau 2018), meanwhile, 9,792 people left Fayette County to move out of state. Another 11,337 moved to a different county, for a total of 21,129 people.
- Combining the two, the flow across state lines represented a total of  $12,179 + 3,587 = 15,766$  into Fayette County from outside the state, compared to 9,792 leaving Fayette for out of state. If we assume the new arrivals have the same probability of being registered as those departing had, then the ratio of registrations to deletions should be 1.61-to-1, much smaller than seen in Table 2.

Finally, the estimate of population turnover can be used to strip some phantom registrants from the data. The registration of new voters mostly follows solid, standardized procedures whereas the removal of obsolete registrations occurs haphazardly, so we will assume that the new registrants for the period represent the right number whereas the deletions need to be estimated upward. I use the migration in and out of state because it will be conservative compared to an analysis based on migration across Fayette County lines. (People from around the state move into Fayette more, while people from Fayette move out of

state more.) Dividing 65,087 by 1.61 gives an estimate for the number of departing voters who should have been stripped from the rolls: 40,427, much higher than the 11,291 removals that actually took place!

Reducing the estimate of real registered voters, which is to say reducing the numerator, by 40,427 – 11,291 (which is to say adjusting the numerator down to 195,523) does decrease the apparent registration rate. But it does not yank it down as sharply as the turnout reported to the Census Bureau. Using both this numerator, computed using migration data, and the denominator that strips out both non-citizens and convicted felons, I estimate that 87.8% of eligible Fayette adults already appear as real cases in the Fayette County voter-registration list. If that's true, AVR could not make much difference to Fayette County, because almost any community will contain some people who simply do not want to vote.

## **Conclusion**

Reformers hope to implement Automatic Voter Registration in Kentucky, expecting that AVR could expand political participation substantially. After reviewing the research on similar attempts to make registering easier, as well as data that can be used in a variety of ways to estimate Fayette County registration rates, I am skeptical that replacing the already handy Motor Voter process for registering voters with a more-active alternative of the same thing will do much good at actually increasing voter turnout. AVR might increase the voting rolls some, given that somewhere in the range of 10-30% of eligible adults in Fayette County remain unregistered. But those numbers, while regrettably large, line up with the share of adults who report that they do not much care about politics and generally lack motivation to vote.

AVR might backfire, as Early Voting did, or at least reinforce existing inequalities. If AVR makes life easier for people who were inclined to register and vote anyway, while not making much difference to demographic groups that lack motivation to vote, such a reform would not equalize political influence or political participation – and might worsen the inequality. That fits with the pattern followed by some recent election reforms, pulling into the polling booth the same sorts of people who were already exhibiting decently high participation rates. The effects

of such reforms can be too limited to justify the social costs of adopting them. Determining whether that pessimism is warranted, however – or if, instead, Automatic-Voter Registration likely would reduce inequities – would require additional research that (1) employs more-sophisticated methods of estimating and refining the registration numbers, (2) digs down into the Fayette County data to look at variation across neighborhoods, and (3) pulls other Kentucky counties into the analysis.

### **Acknowledgments**

First and foremost, the author thanks Fayette County Clerk Donald W. Blevins, Jr., whose curiosity “to see how we’re doing” on voter registration led him to fund this research. He placed no parameters around the conclusions I might reach, wanting an independent judgment; his sole stipulation was that, to the extent possible, I employ University of Kentucky students rather than conducting the research myself. That indirect process did lead to some false starts and lengthy delays, as we had to give up on students who went AWOL and replace them with new ones, and I ultimately completed the work on my own. Nevertheless, along the way I received ample assistance from three savvy UK researchers. Graduate student Travis Taylor took responsibility for the criminal-justice data and helped me supervise the undergraduates. Graduate student Peter Lynch surveyed the research literature on AVR and wrote the first draft of our review. And undergraduate Anne Klette worked through the thorny process of gathering low-level Census data, which will be useful if, as I hope, the research agenda expands beyond this preliminary report on AVR and focuses on registration and turnout in Kentucky more generally. Despite the able assistance of those students, responsibility for the final report rests with me, and all errors are mine. Should you find any, great or small, please alert me at [doubledennyconsulting@gmail.com](mailto:doubledennyconsulting@gmail.com) so that I may release an amended report.

**D. Stephen Voss, Ph.D.**

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